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SEVERED MINERAL INTERESTS
ERNEST R. FLECK*

In 1920 the North Dakota Supreme Court stated, "Minerals in
place are land and may be conveyed as other lands are conveyed.
'A mining right may be separated from the surface, which may be
held by one person and the mining right by another, and the ownership of mines whether opened or unopened, may exist distinct
from the ownership of the surface. There may be as many different owners as there are strata; ... and each is a freehold estate of
inheritance. . . The severance of a mine and the -surface of lands
may be accomplished by a conveyance of the mines and minerals,
or by a conveyance of the land with a reservation or exception to
the mines and minerals. There is no substantial difference between
these two methods in the result accomplished. . . .,
The severance of the mineral estate from the surface estate
in land has caused some problems, litigation and legislation over
the years, but these were minimized by general acceptance of the
doctrine of mineral estate dominance. Today, however, there
appears to be an erosion of this concept and an increased concern
for the rights of the surface owner.
This discussion is limited to some of the more important methods, of severing the mineral and surface estate and the relative
rights and obligations of the owners of such mineral and surface
estates.
I. RESERVATIONS UNDER UNITED STATES PATENTS
The first homestead act passed by Congress was approved on
May 20, 1862.2 Prior to that time public lands 'had been sold to
the highest bidders.3 Under the homestead acts the theory was
to encourage settlement of the public domain by rewarding the settlers with the land after they had resided upon, cultivated and im*

Fleck, Mather, Strutz & Mayer, Ltd., Bismarck, N.D., J.D., 1948, Notre Dame.
1. Beulah Coal Mining Co. v. Heihn, 46 N.D. 646, 651, 180 N.W. 187, 189 (1920) quoting
18 R.C.L. 1174-76.
2. Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392.
8. The first act governing the sale, to the highest bidder, of public lands "in the terrtory northwest of the river Ohio!' was the Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 464.
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proved it.' Following the passage of the Lode Mining Acts 5 and

until after 1900, lands were generally patented as mineral lands or
as agricultural lands. It was not considered that lands could be
patented for agriculture if the land was thought to be more valuable for mining.,
Starting with the Act of March 3, 1909, 7 providing for agri-

cultural entry upon coal land, a new policy was established permitting agricultural entries upon mineral lands with a reservation of
the minerals, for which the land had been classified as mineral.
This act of March 3, 1909, provided for the reservation to the
United States of all coal and the right to prospect for, mine, and
remove the same.8
The act of June 22, 1910, 9 went further and opened the coal
lands 'to entry under the homestead laws, the desert-land law, the
Carey Act, and the Reclamation Act, provided a reservation to the
United States was made of the coal and of the right to prospect
for, mine and remove the coal. The Acts of 1909 and 1910 provided that if it could be proved that such lands should not have
been classified as coal land the entryman could secure a patent
without reservation of the coal. 10
The 1909 act provided that,
[N]o person shall enter upon said lands to prospect for,
or mine and remove coal therefrom, without previous consent
of the owner under such patent, except upon such condition
as to security for the payment of all damages to such owner
caused thereby as may be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction."'

In the 1910 act it was provided that,
Any person who has acquired from the United States the
coal deposits in any such land, or the right to mine or remove the same, may reenter and occupy so much, of the
4.

Entry under the first Homestead Act required an affidavit "that said entry is made

for the purpose of actual settlement and cultivation ....

" Act of May 20,

1862, ch. 75,

§

2, 12 Stat. 392. A patent was issued to the person making an entry, his widow, or his or
her heirs or devisee upon proof "by two credible witnesses that he, she, or they have resided upon or cultivated the same for the term of five years immediately succeeding the
time of filing the affidavit aforesaid .... Id.
5.
6.

Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251; Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91.
Cf. 1 RIKY MT. MIN. L. FOUND., AMERICAN LAw OF MINING § 1.10 (1974) (discussing

Agriculture v. Mining).
7. 80 U.S.c. J 81 (1970)
844).
8. Id.
9.

Id.

§§ 83-85

(1970)

(originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1909, ch. 270, 35 Stat.

(originally enacted as Act of June 22, 1910, ch. 318, 36 Stat. 583).

The desert-land law is the Act of March 3, 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377. The Carey Act is
the Act of August 18, 1894, ch. 301, § 4, 28 Stat. 422. The Reclamation Act is the Act of
June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388.
10. 30 U.S.C. §§ 81, 85 (1970).
11. Id. § 81.
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surface thereof as may be required for all purposes reasonably incident to the mining and removal of the coal
therefrom, and mine and remove the coal, upon payment of
the damages caused thereby to the owner thereof, or upon
giving a good and sufficient bond or undertaking in a action instituted in any competent court to ascertain and fix
said damages. 12
There are numerous other acts providing for the issuance of
patents with reservations or exceptions of oil, gas, or other minerals to the United States. The two most important of such acts
are those of July 17, 1914,13 and December 29, 1916.14
Patents issued under the 1974 act provided for the excepting
and reserving to the United States all of the oil and gas or other
stated non-metallic minerals, i.e. phosphate, nitrate, potash or aspaltic materials, in the land so patented. Persons authorized by
the United States had the right to prospect for, mine and remove
such deposits.
The Stock Raising Homestead Act contains the provision for,
a reservation to the United States of all the coal and other
minerals in the lands so entered and patented, together with
the right to prospect for, mine and remove the same.15
It is to be noted that the Act of 1914 specifically mentions
oil and gas in the reservation, while the Act of 1916 states "coal
and other minerals." It has been held 6 that the term "other minerals" in the Act did include oil and gas.
The Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916 provides:
Any person who has acquired from the United States the
coal or other mineral deposits in any such land, or the right
to mine and remove the same, may reenter and occupy so
much of the surface thereof as may be required for all purposes reasonably incident to the mining and removal of the
coal or other minerals, first, upon securing the written consent of waiver of the homestead entryman or patentee;
second, upon payment of the damages to crops or other
tangible improvements to the owner thereof, where agreement may be had as to the amount thereof; or, third, in
lieu of either of the foregoing provisions, upon the execution
12. Id. § 85.
13. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1212-23 (1970)
Stat. 509).
14. 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301 (1970)
39 Stat. 862).
15. Act of December 29, 1916, ch.
16. Skeen v. Lynch, 48 F.2d 1044

(originally enacted as Act of July 17, 1914, ch. 142, 38
(originally enacted as Act of December 29, 1916, ch. 9,
9, § 9, 39 Stat. 864 (codified at 43 U.S.C. 299) (1970).
(10th Or. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 638 (1931).
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of a good and sufficient bond or undertaking to the United
States for the use and benefit of the entryman or owner of
the land, to secure the payment of such damages to the
crops or tangible improvements of the entryman or owner,
as may be determined and fixed in an action brought upon
the bond or undertaking in a court of competent jurisdiction,
against the principal and sureties thereon ... 17
There appear to be no important cases involving disputes between the surface owner and the mineral claimant with respect
to patents issued under the 1909 and 1910 Acts.
Howard A. Twittey .noted in discussing the law of subjacent support that,
Acts of Congress providing for the issuance of non-mineral
patents with a reservation of minerals were enacted to
carry out the expressed national policy of conserving the
natural resources for future
generations and encouraging
18
settlement of the West.
Mr. Twittey quoted from President Taft's special message
to Congress on conservation of natural resources, transmitted on
January 14, 1910, as follows:
It is now proposed to dispose of agricultural lands as such,
and at the same time to reserve for other disposition the
treasure of coal, oil, asphaltum, natural gas, and phosphate
contained therein. This may be best accomplished by separating the right to mine from the title to the surface,
giving the necessary use of so much of the latter as may
be required for the extraction of the deposits. 19
Congress has provided in each of the above mentioned acts
for a procedure whereby the surface owner would receive payment
of damages from the holder of the mineral estate as a result of
mining operations.
There have been several cases involving the Act of July 17, 1914,20
which provided for entries under the non-mineral laws, reserving
oil and gas and other specified minerals, and which contained a
damage clause2 comparable to the damage clause 22 in the 1910
act. The leading case is Kinney-Coastal Oil Company v. Kieffer, 23
in which it was held that the surface estate was servient to the
mineral estate and in which it was indicated that the oil lessee
might take the entire surface. In spite of the plain language of
17. 43 U.S.C. 299 (1970).
18. Twlttey, Law of Subjac6nt Support and the Right to Totally Destroy Surface in Mining Operations, 6 RKY. MT. MIN. LAW INST., 497, 514 (1961).
19. Id. at 514-15.
20. 30 U.S.C. §§ 121-23 (1970).
21. Id. § 122.
22. Id. § 81.
23. 277 U.S. 488 (1927).

SEVERED MINERAL INTERESTS

the statute, it was held that damages were limited to the surface
owner's agricultural improvements and crops. In Bordieu v. Seaboard Oil Corporation of Delaware,24 the entry of the oil company
was upheld with the court stating:
By he statutes a servitude is placed upon the ,surface estate
for the benefit of the mineral estate, but the obligation is
placed upon the holder of the dominant estate, upon entering and occupying any portion of the surface, to pay the
owner of the servient estate the damages caused thereby.
we believe, is clearly a liability created by
This liability,
2 5
statute.
As to damages, the court held in Bordieu that the lessee was
liable for all damages to the surface as provided in the 1914 act,
and also for damages arising from use of a portion of the surface
occupied by the lessee for purposes not related to the extraction of
26
oil from the plaintiff's land.
In Holbrook v. Continental Oil Company,27 the entry of the lessee was again upheld. The court found as a matter of law that no
damage had been sustained by the plaintiff in that there was no
damage to growing crops or permanent improvements, nor was there
any pollution of water.2 8 The court noted that construction of
houses by the lessee for its employees on plaintiff's premises was
reasonably incident to its right under the lease and did not con29
stitute trespass.
The latest statute 0 dealing with liabilities of federal lessees to
surface owners specifically recognizes the possibility of destruction
of surface by strip or open-pit mining methods on land included
in, a stock raising or other homestead entry or patent; it provides
as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any act of Congress to the
contrary, any person who hereafter prospects for, mines, or
removes by strip or open-pit mining methods, any minerals
from any land included in a stock raising or other homestead entry or patent, and who had been liable under such
an existing Act only for damages caused thereby to the
crops or improvements of the entryman or patentee, shall
also be liable for any damage that may be caused to the
value of the land for grazing by such prospecting for, mining, or removing of minerals. Nothing in this section shall
be considered to impair 'any vested right in existence on
June 21, 1949.31
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

38 Cal. App. 2d 11, 100 P.2d 528 (1940).
Id. at -,
100 P.2d at 532.
100 P.2d at 535.
Id. at
73 Wyd. 321, 278 P.2d 798 (1955).
278 P.2d at 803-06.
Id. at -,
278 P.2d at 802-03.
Id. at -,
§
54
(1970) (enacted as Act of June 21, 1949, ch. 232, § 5, 63 Stat. 215).
30 U.S.C.
Id.
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In the Senate report which accompanied the Act of July 21,
1949, the following statement as to the purpose of the section is
set forth:
In many present-day mining operations, such as that employed
in the production of bentonite, for example, strip-mining
methods are prevalent which permanently destroy the entire surface value of the land for grass-raising and stockgrazing purposes. Thus, the number of head of stock an entryman can raise on his homestead is limited to some extent for both the present and future by the activities of the
holder of the mineral rights on the land.3 2
It would appear that Congress recognized the need for strip or
open-pit mining operations and at the same time intended to provide adequate damages to the surface owner.
The House version of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1974 requires the written consent or acquiescence of the
surface owner where the mineral estate proposed to be mined by
surface coal mining operations is separately owned by the federal
government. 38
In leaving the -subject of reservations in United States patents,
we conclude that, where the mineral and surface estates vest in
different parties as a result of the issuance of a patent, it is necessary to construe the statute under which the patent was issued and
ascertain the legislative intent in order to determine the respective
rights and obligations of the owners of the two estates.
II. MINERAL SEVERANCE BY DEED OR RESERVATION IN
DEED
Where the mineral and surface estates have been severed by
deed of private individuals, it is necessary to construe the deed severing these estates in order to determine the intent of the parties
and the resulting rights and obligations of the owners of the two
estates.
In considering mineral severance by deed, we should consider
for a moment what minerals are so severed. Instruments of conveyance or of reservation most commonly used in the State of
North Dakota refer to "all oil, gas and other minerals in and under
and that may be produced. .

.

.

"

Early decisions were concerned

with whether the term "minerals" included oil and gas. The Majority rule 4 is that while the intention of the parties as indicated
32. S. REP. No. 404, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949).
33. H.R. 11500, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The bill was passed by the House on July
25, 1974. At this writing, House and Senate conferees are deadlocked over this provision
In the bill, which is now numbered S. 425-as is the bill which passed the Senate in 1973.
S. 425, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
84. EL WnLLIms & C. METERs, OIL AND GAs LAw § 219 (1971).
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by a consideration of the language of the whole instrument must
control, the term "minerals" as used in real property instruments
includes oil and gas unless a contrary intention or an ambiguity
is manifest by the language of the instrument as a whole. More
important at the present time is the question of whether or not the
grant of "oil, gas and other minerals" includes coal.
Present North Dakota statutory law provides that:
No conveyance of mineral rights or royalties separate from
the surface rights in real property in this state, excluding
,leases, shall be construed to grant or convey to the grantee
thereof any interest in and to any gravel, coal, clay or uranium, unless the intent to convey such interest is specifically5
and separately set forth in the instrument of conveyance .
Thus the question as to whether or not coal is included in a conveyance of "minerals" arises only by virtue of instruments dated
prior to July 1, 1955.86
While in some instances a grant or reservation has been held
to apply only to minerals known to exist in the land at the time of
the deed, the general rule is that the term "all minerals" includes
all minerals found on the premises whether known to exist or not. 87
While there are some authorities to the contrary, as a general rule
a grant or reservation of mines and minerals includes oil and gas. 8
The results of the decisions vary not only from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, but often within the same jurisdiction. In many instances the courts attempt to determine what was intended by the
language of the instrument involved. What appears to be the general
rule was ably set forth in New Mexico and Arizona Land Company
v. Elkins,8 9 in which case a reservation of "oil, gas and other minerals underlying or pertinent to said land" was held to include
uranium, thorium and associated fissionable materials. Judge Rogers
concluded that extrinsic evidence as to the intent of the parties was
not admissible because the language was unequivocal,4 0 citing
numerous cases 1 to support "the majority rule, the best reasoned
rule and the modern rule . . . that in a grant or a reservation of

mineral rights, it is immaterial whether, at the time of the conveyances, the parties thereto know what minerals were or were
not present on the land. 14 2 The New Mexico court approved, quoted
35. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24 (Supp. 1973). This language Is identical to that of N.D.
Sess. Laws, ch. 235, § 1, at 316 (1955), which it replaced.
36. The effective date of N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 235, § 1, at 316 (1955).
37. Stowers v. Huntington Development & Gas Co., 72 F.2d 969, 971 (4th Cir. 1934).
88. Skeen v. Lynch, 48 F.2d 1044 (10th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 633 (1931)
58 C.J.S. Mines and Minerals § 158 (1938).
39. 137 F. Supp. 767 (D.N.M. 1956).
40. Id. at 770.
41. Stower v. Huntington Development & Gas Co., 72 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1934) ; Maynard
V. McHenry, 271 Ky. 642, 113 S.W.2d 13 (1938); Sellers v. Ohio Valley Trust Co., 248
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and followed Western Development Company v. Nell,43 where the
Utah court held that one seeking to restrict the general meaning
attributed by law to the word "mineral" must bear the burden of
proving the intentions of the parties so to limit the reservation."
In Adams County v. Smith,5 the court, while considering
whether the term "mineral" as used in a reservation statute included coal, stated:
We have found no cases holding that coal is not a mineral.
Whereever the question has been considered the courts have
construed the term "mineral" to include coal. [citations
omitted.] We therefore reach the conslusion that the term
"mineral" as6 used in Ch. 136, Sess. Laws N.D. 1941, includes coal."
47
In Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Stanoilind Oil and Gas Co.,
the court held that the words "all other minerals" contained in an
oil and gas lease covered all other minerals which could be mined
from the earth and not just oil and gas. This case was prior to the enactment of ch. 235, § 1 [1955] Laws of North Dakota 316 which
required that minerals to be included in the lease be specifically
named, a requirement retained in N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-24
(Supp. 1973).
The holding in the Adams County case was applied in Abbey
v. State,4 8 where the court construed the language of Section 380901, North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 to include coal. The statute provided that,"In every transfer of land . . . by the state of
North Dakota, . . . fifty percent of all oil, natural gas or miner' 49
als ... shall be reserved to the state of North Dakota.
The most recent and far reaching case is the North Dakota
Supreme Court decision in Christman v. Emineth,50 where one of
the questions considered by the court was whether or not the term
"all other minerals" as used in a reservation made by The
Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul in 1943 included lignite coal. The
court stated:
In construing the instrument to determine the intention of
the parties, there is one further fact that should be noted.
S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1952); Western Development Co. v. Neil, 4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452
(1955) ; Rowe v.

Chesapeake Mineral Co., 156 F.2d 752

(6th Cir. 1946),

cert. denied, 329

U.S. 776 (1946); Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 136 S.W.2d
800 (1940) ; Kentucky Diamond Mining & Development Co. v. Kentucky Transvaal Diamond
Co., 141 Ky. 97, 192 S.W. 397 (1910).

42.

New Mexico & Arizona Land Co. v. Elkins, 137 F. Supp. 767, 771 (D.N.M. 1956).

43.

4 Utah 2d 112, 288 P.2d 452 (1955).

44. Id. at -,
288 P.2d at 454.
45. 74 N.D. 621, 23 N.W.2d 873 (1946).
46. Id. at 624, 23 N.W.2d at 875.
47. 251 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1958).
48. 202 N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1972).
49. Ch. 165, § 1 [1941] Laws of North Dakota 238
(1960)).
50. 212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1974).

(now N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-09-01
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The instrument reads "all oil, gas and other minerals",
which is the equivalent of saying "all oil, all gas, and all
oher minerals." In MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36,
41 (N.D. 1957), this court had the opportunity to construe
Similar language. In that case Judge Burke said: "We do
think there is signifance in the fact the lease authorized
the lessee to produce not simply oil and gas and other
minerals but oil and gas and all other minerals. No word
is more inclusive than all, and it is difficult to see why, if
the parties intended a restricted construction to be placed
upon the reference to other minerals, they should use a
word so completely unrestricted in its meaning." Upon analysis of the language in question it is our opinion that the
words "all oil, gas and other minerals" were meant to include and do include lignite coal.5 1
It should be noted that N.D. Cent. Code § 47-10-24 (Supp.
1973), requiring the description and definition of minerals in
leases and conveyances, does not mention reservations. A few natural resource lawyers note that a reservation is in fact a grant back
to the grantor and that being a grant back it could be entitled a
conveyance. It would then therefore follow, they contend, that if
a conveyance it would fall within the purview of the statute, but
this interpretation does not correspond to what appears to have
been the legislative intent at the time of adoption of the Act. The
Legislature was, as indicated by hearings on the bill, concerned
with the effect of land owners executing and delivering leases and
mineral deeds, and whether or not such documents included uranium
ore which was the subject of exploration at that time.
III. RESERVATIONS BY THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
Section 155 of the North Dakota Constitution, prior to its amendment in the year 1960, provided:
The coal lands of the state shall never be sold, but the legislative assembly may by general laws provide for leasing
the same. The words coal lands shall include lands bearing
lignite coal.
This provision was codified as N.D. Cent. Code § 15-06-20
(1960).
N.D. Cent. Code 38-09-01 (1960) provides:
In every transfer of land, whether by deed, conract, lease,
or otherwise, by the state of North Dakota, or by any department thereof, fifty per cent of all oil, natural gas, or minerals which may be found on or underlying such land shall be
reserved to the state of North Dakota. Any deed, contract,
lease, or other transfer of any such land made after Feb61.

Id. at 551.
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ruary 20, 1941, which does not contain such reservation
shall be construed as if such reservation were contained therein. The provisions of this section shall apply to all lands
owned by this state or by any department thereof regardless
of how title thereto was acquired.
Between March 13, 1939 and February 20, 1941, this section provided
for a 5% mineral reservation unto the State of North Dakota. 52
In Convis v. State,53 the court held that a contract for deed
made by the Board bf University and School Lands for sale of original school grant lands containing a one hundred per cent mineral
reservation was unauthorized by Section 38-0901 of the North Dakota
Revised Code of 1943, and accordingly the contract must be construed as though it contained only the reservation of a fifty per cent
mineral interest as required by statute. Section 155 of the N.D.
Constitution was thereafter amended to provide:
The legislative assembly shall provide for the sale of all
school lands subject to the provisions of this article. In all
sales of land subject to the provisions of this article all
minerals therein, including but not limited to oil, gas, coal,
cement materials, sodium sulfate, sand and gravel, road
material, building stone, chemical substances, metallic ores,
uranium ores, or colloidal or other clays, shall be reserved
and excepted to the state of North Dakota, except that leases
may be executed for the extraction and sale of such materials in such manner and upon such terms as the legislative assembly may provide. 54
Discussion of the various cases interpreting this section of the
North Dakota constitution is not meant to be within the scope of
55
this paper. However it should be noted that in State v. Oster,
and in Permann v. Knife River Coal Mining Co., 5 the court held
that the Board of University and School Lands must make an ultimate determination as to whether or not certain lands are or are
not coal lands, and that the issuance of a contract for deed to a
purchaser in the absence of fraud or bad faith, is conclusive upon
the state as being a determination that the lands are not coal lands,
notwithstanding a subsequent discovery of coal. In the recent decision of Haag v. State,57 the court noted that N.D. Cent. Code §
38-09-01 (1960), is applicable to coal and that coal is a mineral under
the provisions of such section. 58 In Haag, the court reversed Permann
in part in holding that Section 155 of the Constitution as it existed
52.
59.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 149, at 231 (1939).
104 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1960).
N.D. CONST. art. IM, § 155.
61 N.W.2d 276 (N.D. 1959).
180 N.W.2d 146 (N.D. 1970).
219 N.W.2d 121 (N.D. 1974).
Id. at 127 citing Abbey v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1972).
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prior to its amendment on June 28, 1960, did not restrict the power
of the state pursuant to statute to reserve the oil, gas and minerals
including coal in its original grant lands to the extent permitted
59
by statute.
The various discussions of Section 155 of the N.D. Constitution are applicable only to original school land and the problems
encountered in Permann, Abbey and Haag are not applicable to
other lands acquired, owned and sold by various agencies of the
state of North Dakota, including the Bank of North Dakota. The
mineral reservation requirements of N.D. Cent. Code § 38-09-01
(1960), including coal, apply to such other lands.
Before leaving the question of what minerals are included in
the phrase "Minerals" or "other minerals", a recent Texas decision warrants consideration. In Acker v. Guinn,60 the plaintiff,
Acker, held under the grantee of a mineral deed which conveyed
"an undivided '2 interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other
minerals in and under, and that may be produced from" a tract
of land.61 The deed was written on a form which was in common
use in the State of Texas 62 and is not unlike deed forms used in
the State of North Dakota. The deed form makes reference to an
existing oil and gas lease and the fact that the conveyance to an
existing oil and gas lease and the fact that the conveyance covers
a one-half interest in all the oil and gas rentals and royalties to
be paid under such lease.6 ' The plaintiff claimed that the deed
conveyed an interest in iron ore found in commercial quantities in
the area. The ore deposits were solid beds varying from a few
inches to three or four feet in thickness; they outcropped on the
surface at places and ranged in depth to as much as fifty feet below the surface. 64 The ore could be mined only by open-pit or strip
mining methods, which meant that the surface owner could make
practically no beneficial use of his land where mining was in progress.6 5 In holding that the deed in question did not convey an interest in the iron ore, the Texas court concluded:
The parties to a mineral lease or deed usually think of the
mineral estate as including valuable substances that are removed from the ground by means of wells or mine shafts.
[Footnotes omitted.] This estate is dominant, of course, and
its owner is entitled to make reasonable use of the surface for
the production of his minerals. It is not ordinarily contemplated, however, that the utility of the surface for agricul59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
464
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 131.
S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
at 349.
at 350.
at 350-51.
at 351.

380
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tural or grazing purposes will be destroyed or substantially
impaired. Unless the contrary intention is affirmatively and
fairly expressed, therefore, a grant or reservation of "minerals" or "mineral rights" should not be construed to include
a substance that must be removed by methods that will,
in effect, consume or deplete the surface estate ...
[T]here is nothing in the deed even remotely suggesting
an intention to vest in the grantee the right to destroy the sur8
face.6
With Acker in mind, we again briefly look at Christman. It
was argued there that:
the use of the words with such easement for ingress, egress
and use of the surface as may be incidental or necessary to
use of such rights discloses that such rights were not intended to allow the grantor to completely destroy the surface
and consequently destroy7 its agricultural value by removing
the coal by strip mining.
In response the court stated:
The language in the instant case is clear, unambiguous, and
without limitation. It severs the minerals from the surface of
the land, retaining in the grantor the right to enter and use
the surface for any purpose reasonably necessary for the
use of his mineral right. His rights are a fee simple estate in
the minerals "in or under" the land in question. [Citation
omitted.] It is then reasonable to assume that the parties
intended that the grantor should have the right to use the surface to whatever extent reasonably necessary to remove
fifty per cent of "all oil, gas, and other minerals."'8
The court further noted that "It is reasonable to assume that
the parties to the deed in question knew of the existence of lignite
coal in the area and that strip mining was the best method of removing said coal. ....
"69 Further the court noted that our legislature had foreseen the problem of disturbance of the surface by strip
mining when in 1969 it provided for the reclamation of strip mined
lands.70
Before leaving Christman we should note that the court also
held N.D. Cent. Code §§ 4710-20, -22 (1960) to be unconstitutional
because they involved an unreasonable classification and an invidious discrimination in violation of the equal protection clauses of
Section 20 of the Constitution of North Dakota and the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 71 The statutory
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 352-53.
Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 549-50 (N.D. 1973).
Id. at 550.
Id.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 556.
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sections involved required that in any reservation of coal there must
be an accurate description of the nature, length, width and thickness
7 2
of the coal reserved.
Notwithstanding Christman it is anticipated that questions of use
and destruction of the surface and the right of subjacent support
will be the subject of future litigation in the State of North Dakota.
Under the doctrine of subjacent support, the surface estate is
entitled to the support it requires from the underlying mineral estate
to sustain it in its natural condition.7 3 The concept originally was
applied to underground mining but it has in recent years been applied to cases involving strip mining. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Coxe v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company,7' 4 held that the
fact that coal can be removed only by strip mining does not change
the principle that the surface owner is entitled to support of the surface.
The right to subjacent support may be waived but whether or
not it has been waived is a question for the courts.7 5 In authorizing the mineral owner to "use so much of the surface as may be necessary" did the surface owner intend to authorize the mineral
owner to destroy the surface? Contrary to Christman, the Colorado
Supreme Court in Barker v. Mintz76 refused to extend that intention to stripping operations. In Peabody Coal Co. v. Erwin7 7 the
court of appeals reversed the district court and held that only underground mining was contemplated by the wording of a 1902 deed,
not strip mining. Some courts have noted that even where there is
an implied waiver of subjacent support, strip mining may not have
been authorized if strip mining was not practiced in the local area
where the deed was made. 7 The decisions in other states appear to
be inconsistent and are based upon the application of various rules,
72. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-10-21, -22 (1960). The court said the two sections established
a classification which "distinguishes transfers of coal by direct grant from transfers of
coal by reservation or exception. It places a burden upon the latter type of transfer that it
doesn't place upon the former, that burden being that in the latter case the coal must be
described accurately as to nature, in length, width and thickness, whereas In the former
case it need not be so described." Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 554 (N.D. 1973).
The court later said: "We can conceive of no reasonable basis for requiring that the nature,
length, width and thickness of coal reservations be described when such a description is not
required of grants of coal. It would seem that if the description was of value it would be
so regardless of how title to the coal was required." Id. at 556.
73. This doctrine is discussed In 2 C. LINDLEY, AMERICAN LAW RELATING TO MINES AND
MINERAL LANDS §§ 818-23 (2d ed. 1903). "There is a prima facie inference at common law
upon every grant of minerals or other subjacent strata, where the surface is retained by
the grantor, that the grantor in granting them does so in a manner consistent with the retention by himself of his own right to support." Id. at § 818.
74. 398 Pa. 424, 158 A.2d 782 (1960).
75. See Twitty, Law of Subjacent Support and the Right to Totally Destroy Surface
in Mining Operations, 6 RxY. MT. MIN. LAW INST. 497 (1961).
76. 73 Colo. 262, 215 P. 534 (1923).
77. 453 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1971).
78. See, e.g., Merrill v. Manufacturers Light and Heat Co., 409 Pa. 68, 185 A.2d 573
(1962).
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with some courts considering extrinsic evidence or local customs
and practice while others refused such consideration. 9
If a trend in these decisions is developing it may be manifest
in Steward v.. Chernicky,s ° where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
stated:
[T]his Court recognizes that "strip mining is an accepted
manner or method of coal mining, which, with the use of modern huge and efficient machinery, has become progressively
more in vogue". [Citation omitted.] And this Court does
not wish to interfere with its use or hinder its economic viability. Yet we cannot help but realize that "in view of the
surface violence, destruction and disfiguration which inevitably attend strip or open mining, . . . no land owner would
lightly or casually grant strip mining rights, nor would any
purchaser of land treat lightly any reservation of mining
rights which would permit the grantor or his assignee to come
upon his land and turn it into a battleground with strip min[Citation omitted.] Therefore, "the burden rests
ing'..
upon him who seeks to assert the right to destroy or injure
the surface" [Citation omitted.] to show some positive indication that the parties to the deed agreed, to authorize practices which may result in these consequences. Particularly is
this so where such operations were not common at the time
the deed was executed."'
If the mineral estate is to be truly dominant with respect to the
surface estate, it must carry with it as a matter of law the absolute
right to use, damage or destroy so much of the surface estate as
is necessary or convenient to the removal of minerals from the property. However it is doubtful that many jurisdictions will accord the
mineral estate that degree of dominance as a matter of law. In all
probability the courts will not merely imply a right to damage or
destroy the surface in order to remove the. minerals. If the right is
to exist, it must arise by virtue of the deed or other instrument of
conveyance or reservation.
Many coal companies are diminishing possible problems with
surface owners by obtaining surface leases providing for the payment of a per ton royalty, notwithstanding the fact that the surface
owner owns no interest in the coal.
IV. RIGHTS OF A COTENANT TO REMOVE MINERALS
It appears that operation of a mine can proceed in most jurisdictions, including North Dakota, so long as the mine operator ac79. A good recent discussion of these cases is found in Ferguson, Severed Surface and
Mineral Estates--Right to Use, Damage or Destroy the Surface to Recover Minerals, 19
RKY. MT. MIN. LAW INST. 411 (1974).

80.
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489 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970).
266 A.2d at 263 (footnote omitted).
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counts for all ores removed from the lands, subject to the non-joining cotenancy interest. Except in three jurisdictions, West Virginia,
Illinois and Louisiana, a cotenant may mine without the consent of
the other cotenants. The mining cotenant will be required to account
to the other cotenants for the ore removed from the lands affected
by their interest.8 2 The general rule has been stated as follows:
Although the cotenant may extract minerals to the extent
of his undivided interest therein, he may not exclude the
other cotenants from also mining the property. If such mining
activity does exclude the other cotenants, it is a trespass.
Probably, the trespassing cotenant would not acquire title
to the ores thus severed. By the same reasoning, if the lessee
or licensee of a cotenant undertakes mining operations purporting to hold the exclusive right to mine on the premises
and thereby excludes other cotenants or their lessees or licensees, such action constitutes a trespass as to the nonconsenting cotenants, and while no cases have been found
on the point, it is likely that no title is acquired to ores thus
severed. 88
In Campbell v. Homer Ore Co., 4 the court was concerned with
an action to recover damages for the unauthorized mining and
removal of iron ore after defendant's lease was terminated as to
plaintiffs who had a 1/24th interest in the property. The court held
that the defendant could not escape liability to the plaintiffs for
their proportionate share of the ore on the ground that 1/24th of the
total ore had not been removed and was still left, since neither the
quality or the amount of the iron ore is capable of precise determination and lessee as a tenant in common in possession has no superior right to choose the ore most convenient to mine.8 5 The court
further went on to hold that the defendant lessee "was entitled to
mine the ore and to deduct the cost though such cost might not be
deductible to a mere willfull trespasser without any right or claim
of title."8 6
In Ellison v. Strandback,8 7 the court held in an action to quiet
title that as a co-owner of realty each tenant in common "had a right
to enter upon the common estate and take possession of the whole
thereof, subject only to the equal rights of his companions in interest."8 8
Thus it would appear that as a general rule, mining operations
may continue subject to the mine operator's being fully account82.

Co-ownership of mines and minerals is discussed in 4 RKY. MT. MIN. LAW FOUND.,
LAW Op MINING title X=II (Supp. 1974).
Id. § 25.3, at 513 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
309 Mich. 693, 16 N.W.2d 125 (1944).
Id. at -,
16 N.W.2d at 127.
Id. at -,
16 N.W.2d at 127.
62 N.W.2d 95 (N.D. 1954).
Id. at 99.
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able to the non-consenting tenant in common. Whether or not cost
of operations can be deducted from the non-consenting tenant's
share of the mined substances seems to turn somewhat on whether
or not the other cotenants or the mine operator are in fact trespassers.
The rights of co-tenants are further discussed, by the North Dakota Supreme Court in the case of Schank v. North American Royalties, Inc. 9 In this case the court noted the general rule that
The owners of undivided portions of oil and gas rights in
and under the same land are tenants in common and each
cotenant may enter upon the premises for the purpose of
exploring for oil and gas and may drill and develop such
premises. [without the consent of the other].9 °
The court further noted that each cotenant acts for 'himself in such
situation and one is not the agent of the other, nor has he the authority to bind the other merely because he is a co-tenant, unless he
is authorized to do so.9 1 Upon discovery of oil and gas upon the
premises, the court noted, "the producing cotenant must account
to the nonconsenting or nonproducing cotenant for his pro rata
share of the net profits apportioned according to the fractional in'
terest of said cotenant.

' 92

V. PARTITION
N.D. Cent. Code § 32-16-01 (Supp. 1973) provides that, "When
several cotenants hold and are in possession of real or personal property as partners, joint tenants, or tenants in common, in which one
or more of them have an estate or inheritance, or for life or lives,
or for years, an action may be brought by one of more of such persons for a partition ... and for a sale of such property or a part thereof, if it appears that a partition cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners." An action for partition may be commenced by
a proper party having such right by the filing and service of a complaint joining all owners of an interest in such property as parties
defendant. 93 There do not appear to be any North Dakota decisions
indicating whether or not this statute may be applied to the mineral
estate. However in a Kansas decision 9 ' the court indicated that the
right of partition was applicable to all property capable of being
owned in cotenancy and accordingly is applicable to stone, coal, oil,
89.
90.
91.
92.

201 N.W.2d 419 (N.D. 1972).
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gas and other minerals in place. 95 Generally the decision indicates that tenants in common of deposits of ol, gas, coal and other
minerals under the surface of the land, are entitled to partition either by sale and division of the proceeds or in kind as may be demanded by the circumstances. The courts have generally agreed
that partition was necessary for the best interests and benefit of
96
all the tenants in common.
VI. STATE STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF THE SURFACE
In Colorado and Wyoming statutes have been enacted providing
that where the surface and mineral estates are separate the owner
or rightful occupant of the surface estate may demand satisfactory
security from the mine operator, and if it be refused may enjoin
97
him until security is given.
The Landowner Notification Act 9s adopted by the Montana Legislature in 197199 and amended in 1973100 requires notice to the land
owner of surface operations including disclosure of the plan of
work and operations contemplated. 1 1 Before commencement of any
work or operations on any such lands, the operator must first obtain from the surface owner written approval of the proposed work
10 2
and operations.
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96. E.g. Stern v. Great S. Land Co., 148 Miss. 649, 114 So. 739 (1927) ; White v. Smyth,
147 Tex. 272, 214 S.W.2d 967 (1948) ; Kentucky Bell Corp. v. Moss, 311 Ky. 114, 223 S.W.2d
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